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CHARTING DEVELOPMENTS
CONCERNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
IS THE TIDE CHANGING?
John Y. Gotanda*Â
I. INTRODUCTION
As United States courts decide claims for punitive damages, they
continue to stir the waters. Recently, a federal district court ordered
Exxon to pay US$4.5 billion in punitive damages arising from the Valdez
oil spill;1 the Florida Supreme Court set aside a US$145 billion punitive
damages award against tobacco companies;2 and the United States Supreme Court decided to revisit its efforts to stem the flow of excessive
punitive damages awards.3

The reaction outside the United States to

American court awards of punitive damages has been largely negative.4

*

Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Professor of Law, Director
J.D./M.B.A. Program, Villanova University School of Law.
1
See In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004).
2
See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. SC03-1856, 2006 WL 1843363 (Fla.
July 6, 2006).
3
See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 P.3d 1165, cert. granted, 74
U.S.L.W. 3572, 3665, 3668 (U.S. May 30, 2006) (No. 05-1256).
4
See Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the
Federal Cartel Office on the Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages actions
for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (F.R.G.), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/140_en.
pdf (stating that “experience in the USA shows a significant potential for misuse [of
punitive damages]”); European Chemical Industry Council, The Comments of the
Chemical Industry on the Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach
of
EC
Antitrust
Rules
(Apr.
12,
2006),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/022.pdf
(“The US system is based on different cultural values and elements that overencourage individual citizens to fight unduly before law courts, including with regard to anti-trust enforcement such as: treble damages . . . .”); United States Department
of
State,
Enforcement
of
Judgments,
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This should come as no surprise as most civil law countries prohibit punitive damages in private actions and, even in those common law countries
that allow awards of such damages, the size of the American awards
dwarfs what is allowable in those countries. Accordingly, to date, courts
in many countries have barred their courts from enforcing American punitive damages awards on the grounds that they violate the host country’s
public policy. However, the tide may be about to change.
Recent developments in France, Germany, and the European Union, as well as in Canada, Australia and Spain point toward greater receptivity toward punitive damages and the enforcement of these foreign
awards. In France, proposed revisions to the French Civil Code call for
the awarding of punitive damages in some cases.5 In Germany, a study

http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_691.html (noting that “a principal
stumbling block [preventing other countries from reaching an agreement with the
United States on enforcement of judgments] appears to be the perception of many
foreign states that U.S. money judgments are excessive according to their notions of
liability”); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 879 (2005) (noting that
“punitive damages have been subject to a great deal of criticism, both within and
without the United States”); George Kerevan, Price for Democracy in Courts is
Ignorance of Law, SCOTSMAN, Jan. 19, 2001 (“US juries routinely show bias against
big business by awarding huge damages in civil cases.”); Iain Pester, The Needs of a
Successful Justice System, TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 7, 1995 (arguing that the “problem”
behind “the frenzy of litigation seen in America” is “the excessive and punitive damages awarded by American juries”).
5
See Avant-projet de reforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du
Code civil), et du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil), art.
1371 (Sept. 22, 2005). The “working group of reform of the right of the obligations,
was a commission of academics sponsored by Association Henri Capitant and directed by Professor Pierre Catala tasked with developing a proposal to reform Book
III of Title III of the French Civil code (“Of the Contracts or Conventional Obligations in General”).
See. http://www.henricapitant.org/IMG/pdf/Avantprojet_de_reforme_du_droit_des_obligations_et_de_la_prescription_et_expose_des_m
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by a prominent scholar finds that German courts are beginning to award
penal damages in civil actions.6 In the European Union, a European
Commission Green Paper raises the possibility of allowing the doubling
of damages in certain antitrust cases.7 In Australia, a recent decision by
the Supreme Court of South Australia opines that Australian courts would
enforce large punitive damages awards ordered by American courts.8
And in Canada and Spain, the courts have enforced American judgments
that included punitive damages.9 While these developments do not point
toward clear sailing for acceptance of American punitive damages abroad,
when viewed together they may foreshadow a change in the wind that
may ultimately lead to greater enforcement of foreign awards of these
damages.

otifs.pdf. For an English translation of the proposed revisions to the Code of Obligations,
see
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.henricapitant.org/a
rticle.php3%3Fid_article%3D47&sa=X&oi=translate&resnum=3&ct=result&prev=/se
arch%3Fq%3Dbicentenaire%2Bdu%2BCode%2Bcivil%2Ble%2B11%2Bmars%2B2
004%2Band%2Bhenri%2Bcapitant%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D%26sa%3DG
(Alain
Levasseur and David Gruning trans., 22 Sept. 2005).
6
See Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 105, 160 (2003).
7
See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp_en.p
df.
8
See Benefit Strategies Group, Inc. v. Anor Prider, [2005] S.A.S.C. 194 (Australia).
9
See Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, ¶ 76 (Canada); Miller Import
Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L., STS, Nov. 13, 2001 (Exequátur No. 2039/1999)
(Spain), translated in Scott R. Jablonski, Translation and Comment: Enforcing U.S.
Punitive Damages Awards in Foreign Courts – A Recent Case in the Supreme Court
of Spain, 24 J.L. & COM. 225, 231-43 (2005).
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II. OVERVIEW
Punitive damages, also called “exemplary” or “penal” damages,

are “sums awarded apart from any compensatory or nominal damages,
usually . . . because of particularly aggravated misconduct on the part of
the defendant.”10 The primary rationales for punitive damages are to punish and deter certain conduct, especially willful or malicious conduct.11
Courts and commentators have asserted that punitive damages also
“vent[] the indignation of the victimized,”12 discourage the injured party
from engaging in self-help remedies,13 compensate victims for otherwise
uncompensable losses,14 and reimburse the plaintiff for litigation expenses that are not otherwise recoverable.15
Most civil law countries limit recovery of damages in private actions to compensatory damages.16 These countries prohibit punitive dam-

10

DAN B. DOBBS, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 204 (1973) (citing
Restatement of Torts § 908 (1939)). See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275 (1935) (“Exemplary damages are assessed for the
avowed purpose of visiting a punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure of
any loss or detriment to the plaintiff.”).
11
See 1 LINDA SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (5th ed. 2005);
Jane Mallor & Brian Roberts, Punitive Damages: Towards a Principled Approach,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 648 (1980).
12
Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847, 851 (1985).
13
See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (1982).
14
See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517,
520 (1957); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437–38
n.11 (2001); see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 163, 179 (2003).
15
See Ellis, supra note 13, at 3.
16
See, e.g., Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [OR] arts. 45–47 (Switz.); Codice civile [C.C.]. art. 1223 (Italy); Belgian Civil Code art. 1382; Código Civil [C.C.]
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ages in private actions because they consider punitive damages a form of
punishment that is appropriate only in criminal proceedings.17
By contrast, punitive damages are generally available in common
law countries, although the circumstances under which they are allowed
and the amounts allowed differ from country to country.18 For example,
in England, punitive damages are generally restricted to three categories
of cases: (1) suits involving oppressive action by government servants;
(2) suits involving conduct calculated to result in profit which may well
exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (3) suits for punitive damages expressly authorized by statute.19 In New Zealand, while
punitive damages are more widely available than in England, the size of
punitive damages awards has been significantly smaller than in the
United States.20 Further, while punitive damages are available in antitrust

arts. 1106, 1902 (Spain); Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] art. 249
(F.R.G.); Finland Damages Act of 1974, summarized in THE FINNISH LEGAL
SYSTEM, 134 (J. Uotila ed., 2d ed. 1985); Astikos Kodikas [A.K.] [Civil Code] arts.
297[299 (Greece); Civil Code of the Polish People’s Republic art. 444; Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 15 (Russ.); Czech Republic Civil Code §
442 [Czech Civ. C.]; Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] § 162 (Neth.).
17
See Behr, supra note 6, at 127–28; Joachim Zekoll, Recognition and Enforcement of American Products Liability Awards in the Federal Republic of Germany, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 325-26 (1989); Wolfgang Kühn, RICO Claims in
International Arbitration and their Recognition in Germany, 11(2) J. INT’L ARB. 37,
42 (June 1994).
18
See John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 398 (2004).
19
See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.); see also Cassell & Co., Ltd.
v. Broome, [1972] 1 All E.R. 801 (H.L.). For a discussion of the awarding of punitive damages in common law countries, see Gotanda, supra note 18, at 398–440.
20
See Joanna Manning, Reflections on Exemplary Damages and Personal Injury Liability in New Zealand, 2002 N.Z. L. REV. 180-81 (2002).
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cases in the United States,21 they have not thus far been awarded in the
United Kingdom.22 Moreover, there is no consensus among common law
countries on whether an arbitrator, as opposed to a judge, may award punitive damages.23
All countries prohibit excessive awards of damages, including excessive awards of punitive damages.

What constitutes an excessive

award varies from country to country.24
It is unclear whether countries that do not allow punitive damages
will enforce a foreign arbitral award or foreign court judgment of such
damages. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether countries that allow punitive damages will enforce a large foreign award of such damages, particularly one that is much larger than would be permissible in the enforcing
country. In addition, no consensus exists over whether a common law
country would enforce a foreign punitive damages award that results from
a claim for which the enforcing country would allow only compensatory
relief.
Whether a country will enforce a foreign arbitral award or a for-

21

See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1997).
However, in Healthcare at Home v. Genzyme Limited, Case No. 1060/5/7/06,
5 April 2006, the court is considering whether exemplary damages may be awarded
for the first time in a competition case in the United Kingdom. See Office of Fair
Trading (U.K.), Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper, Damages
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, May 2006 [hereinafter Comments of the
Office
of
Fair
Trading],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/130.pdf.
23
Compare Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc, 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976) with Bonar
v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386–87 (11th Cir. 1988).
24
See Gotanda, supra note 18, at 442.
22
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eign court judgment often depends on whether it has entered into a treaty
or convention providing for its enforcement. Most trading nations have
entered into the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). The New York Convention, which has been adopted by 137 countries to date, provides that
arbitral awards rendered in signatory countries are enforceable in all other
signatory countries, subject to a narrow list of exceptions.25 The exception that is most relevant with regard to the enforcement of punitive damage awards is found in article V(2)(b), which states that a court may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award if it “would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”26
The scope of the public policy exception has been the subject of
considerable controversy. Some countries have interpreted this exception
broadly so that any award violating domestic public policy may be denied
recognition and enforcement.27 Others, such as France, interpret the pub-

25

See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
See also
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXII/treaty1
.asp (listing participant countries).
26
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
supra note 25, art. V(2)(b). In addition, the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, which requires member states to recognize and enforce arbitral decisions made in other member states, has a similar public policy
exception. See The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
art.
5(2)(b),
adopted
January
30,
1975,
available
at
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/iacac/iacac2e.asp.
27
See Karen J. Tolson, Comment, Punitive Damages Awards in International
Arbitration: Does the ‘Safety Valve’ of Public Policy Render Them Unenforceable
in Foreign States?, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 455, 492-94 (1986-87) (discussing case in
which Indian court refused to enforce arbitral award based on domestic public pol-
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lic policy exception narrowly. In these countries, the exception refers to
international public policy.28 Unlike domestic public policy, which includes all of the imperative rules of the State in which enforcement is
sought, international public policy encompasses only those basic notions
of morality and justice accepted by civilized countries.29
By contrast to arbitral awards, no similar treaty or convention on
the enforcement of foreign court judgments has been adopted by a large
number of countries. In the absence of an agreement (such as a bilateral
treaty) on the subject, each country is free to decide whether to recognize
or enforce a foreign court judgment. Thus, it is typically more difficult to
enforce a foreign court judgment than a foreign arbitral award. Furthermore, enforcement decisions have varied greatly, and it is therefore difficult to predict with any degree of certainty whether a court will enforce a
foreign award.
Recently, there was an attempt to reach an agreement on the enforcement of court judgments, which culminated in the Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-

icy).

28

See, e.g., Code de procédure civile [C. PR. CIV.] art. 1502 (Fr.), reprinted in 7
Y.B. COM. ARB. 281–82 (1982). See also Mark A. Buchanan, Public Policy and
International Commercial Arbitration, 26 AM. BUS. L.J., 511, 513–31 (1988).
29
See JULIAN D. M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 534–35 (1978); see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (ruling
that the New York Convention’s “public policy defense should be construed narrowly” and “[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis
only where enforcement would violate the state’s most basic notions of morality and
justice.”).
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ters.30 However, a final convention was never concluded, with punitive
damages being a major source of disagreement.31 Efforts then shifted to
concluding a more limited multilateral treaty on choice of court agreements, which resulted in the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements.32 The Choice of Court Convention “establish[es] rules for
enforcing private party agreements regarding the forum for the resolution
of disputes, and rules for recognizing and enforcing decisions issued by
the chosen forum.”33 Article 11 of the Convention addresses the issue of
punitive damages. It states:
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be
refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment awards
damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that
do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered.
2. The court addressed shall take into account whether
and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of
origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the
proceedings.34
30

See PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, Oct. 30, 1999, reprinted in A
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE app. 1
(John J. Barcelo and Kevin M. Clermont, eds., 2002).
31
See Mark E. Hankin, Proposed Convention Would Help IP Owners, NAT’L
L.J., July 23, 2001, at C20; see also Elaine Massock, et al., Recent Developments in
International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 519, 539
(1999) (“The existence of noncompensatory or excessive damages in U.S. judgments
continues to be a dilemma” in the Hague foreign judgments convention meetings.).
32
See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, 44 I.L.M.
1294,
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98%20.
33
Ronald A. Brand, The New Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/07/insights050726.html.
34
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 32, art. 11; see
Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party
Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 549
(2005) (stating “some member states were attracted by the provisions of Article 11
that may limit the recognition of damage awards to compensatory damages; this
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It remains to be seen whether the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements will be as widely adopted as the New York Convention.
To date, the enforcement of foreign awards of punitive damages
has varied. For example, courts in Japan and Italy have refused to enforce American punitive damage awards.35 Results in Switzerland have
been mixed.
In a 1997 decision, the Supreme Court of Japan upheld a judgment of the Tokyo District Court that refused to enforce punitive damages
awarded by a California court in a case involving misrepresentations with
respect to a lease contract.36 The Supreme Court of Japan ruled that “(1)
punitive damages contravened the principles of civil procedure and judicial justice of Japan; [and] (2) they would not come within the scope of
Article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) and Article 24 of the
Civil Execution Code, or at least run counter to public policy of Japan.”37
In Italy, the Intermediate Court of Appeal in Venice refused to

allows a country to refuse recognition of what these member states consider excessive American awards, especially punitive damages”).
35
See Bryant v. Mansei Kogyo Co., summarized in Takonobu Takehara, Japan,
in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 54, 58 (C. Platto & W.G.
Horton, eds., 2d ed. 1993) (where the court enforced the portion of the judgment
awarding compensatory damages, but disallowed the portion of the judgment awarding punitive damages); Parrot v. Fimez S.p.A., 2002 Guir. It. II 2001 (2002), translated in Lucia Ostoni, Italian Rejection of Punitive Damages in a U.S. Judgment, 24
J.L. & COM. 245, 251–62 (2005).
36
See Takao Tateishi, Recent Japanese Case Law in Relation to International
Arbitration, 17(4) J. INT’L ARB. 63, 71 (Aug. 2000).
37
Id. at 71–72. In a subsequent case, the Japanese Supreme Court found that a
Hong Kong court’s award of litigation costs, including attorneys’ fees, did not contradict public policy. See id. at 73.
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enforce an American award of punitive damages.38 At issue in that case
was the attempted enforcement of an American judgment of US$100,000
for defective design of a motorcycle helmet which allegedly contributed
to the death of the plaintiff’s son.39 Although the American award did not
differentiate between the categories of damages, the Italian court determined that the damages were punitive and, thus, contrary to the public
order.40 The court stated:
Punitive damages . . . clearly have features in common
with criminal law, since in punitive damages cases the
private party exercises the capacity of public authority. It
is clear, therefore, that public damages are in contrast
with public order, since in tort actions (as well as in contract cases) the civil law principles of our legal system assume that compensation to the injured party shall be due
based on the damages that the party actually suffered.41
In Switzerland, the courts appear to be divided on the issue of enforcing foreign punitive damage awards. In a 1982 case, a Court of First
Instance in the Canton of St. Gallen refused to recognize and enforce a
United States judgment containing punitive damages on the ground that
such damages were contrary to public policy.42 In that case, a Texas state
court had “awarded the plaintiffs three times the amount of the actual
damages, on the basis of the defendant’s misrepresentation in connection

38

See Parrot v. Fimez S.p.A., supra note 35.
See id.
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
See Bezirksgericht Sargans, 1 Oct. 1982, discussed in Klaus J. Beucher &
John Byron Sandage, United States Punitive Damage Awards in German Courts:
The Evolving German Position on Service and Enforcement, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 967, 986 n.83 (1991).
39
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with the sale of real estate in Texas.”43 In refusing to enforce the punitive
damages award, the Swiss court “held that the Texas judgment violated
Swiss substantive public policy because it disregarded the fundamental
Swiss principle of . . . prohibition against unjust enrichment [of the plaintiff].”44 The court also held that the penal nature of the award was inappropriate in a civil case.45
By contrast, in a 1989 decision, the Appeals Court of Basel affirmed a lower court decision enforcing a California court’s award of punitive damages.46

In that case, a California court had awarded

US$120,060 in actual damages and US$50,000 in punitive damages based
on “the defendant’s fraudulent misappropriation of cargo containers.”47
The Basel Court of First Instance recognized the judgment, finding that it
did not contradict Swiss public policy because the “primary purpose [of
the punitive damages] had been to force the defendant to restitute to the
plaintiff the unjust profit the defendant had realised, and that punishment
of the defendant had been of only secondary importance.”48
Even common law countries that generally permit the awarding of
punitive damages may choose not to enforce foreign awards of such damages. For example, Canada has enacted legislation that gives the Attor43

Martin Bernet & Nicolas C. Ulmer, Recognition and Enforcement in Switzerland of US Judgments Containing an Award of Punitive Damages, 22(6) INT’L BUS.
LAWYER 272(4), 273 (1994).
44
Id.
45
See id.
46
See id.
47
Id.
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ney General of Canada the discretion to refuse to recognize or enforce a
foreign judgment of treble damages in antitrust cases if it (1) adversely
affects significant Canadian businesses engaged in international trade or
commerce, or (2) either infringes or is likely to infringe on Canadian sovereignty.49 Similarly, England’s Protection of Trading Interests Act of
1980 bars English courts from enforcing foreign judgments of multiple
damages.50
In sum, because many civil law countries prohibit punitive damages in private actions, parties often have been unsuccessful in having
American awards of such damages recognized and enforced in these
countries.

Moreover, because in common law countries there is no

agreement on the circumstances warranting punitive damages and courts
48

Id.
See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49, § 8 (1984) (Canada).
50
See Protection of Trading Interest Act 1980, in 47 HALSBURY’S STATUTES,
569 (4th ed. 2002) (U.K.) (providing that foreign judgments for multiple damages
“shall not be registered under Part II of the Administration of Justice Act or Part I of
the Foreign Judgments Act 1920 or Part I of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act 1933 and no court in the United Kingdom shall entertain proceedings at common law for the recovery of any sum payable under such judgment.”).
The Act also states:
[W]here a court of an overseas country has given a judgment for
multiple damages . . . and an amount on account of the damages
has been paid by the qualifying defendant either to the party in
whose favor the judgment was given or to another party who is entitled as against the qualifying defendant to contribution in respect
of such damages[,] . . . the qualifying defendant shall be entitled to
recover from the party in whose favor the judgment was given so
much of the amount referred to . . . as exceeds the part attributable
to compensation; and that part shall be taken to be such part of the
amount as bears to the whole of it the same proportion as the sum
assessed by the court that gave the judgment as compensation for
the loss or damage sustained by that party bears to the whole of the
damages awarded that party.
49
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differ on the appropriate amount of an award of such damages, parties
have found it difficult to enforce an American award of punitive damages
in these countries as well.
III. SHIFTING CURRENTS?
Up until now, it has been rough sailing for American awards of
punitive damages seeking recognition and enforcement on foreign shores.
Perhaps that is about to change, however.

France, Germany and the

European Union may soon be more receptive to awards of punitive damages. In addition, Spain, a civil law country that does not award punitive
damages in civil actions, recently enforced an American judgment including punitive damages. Furthermore, Australia and Canada, common law
countries, recently enforced American punitive damages awards even
though the same amounts might not have been awarded if the actions had
been brought in those countries.
A. Civil Law Recognition of Punitive Damages in Private Actions
1. France
Like most civil law countries, France has long adhered to the traditional rule that prohibits awards of penal damages in civil actions.51
However, the days of this long standing rule may be numbered.
Under the French Civil Code, damages for breach of contract or

Id. § 6, at 574.
51
See John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages in International Commercial
Arbitration in the Wake of Matrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 59, 66 (1997).
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tort claims are typically limited to restoring the aggrieved parties to the
position they would have been in had the damaging event not occurred.52
While France allows damages for non-pecuniary harm, including moral
damages for mental suffering, such relief is not considered punitive in
nature because they are given to compensate the victim and not to punish
the wrongdoer.53
In 2004, pursuant to a request from President Jacques Chirac, a
commission was formed to reform the Civil Code. This resulted in a preliminary draft to reform the Code of Obligations, which was presented to
the Ministry of Justice in late 2005.54 Most significantly, the proposed
revision to the Code includes a provision allowing for the awarding of
punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages, when a party has
engaged in an obviously deliberate and notably lucrative fault.55 Specifically, proposed Article 1371 provides:
One whose fault is manifestly premeditated, particularly a
fault whose purpose is monetary gain, may be ordered to
pay punitive damages besides compensatory damages.
The judge may direct a part of such damages to the public
treasury. The judge must provide specific reasons for ordering such punitive damages and must clearly distinguish
their amount from that of other damages awarded to the
victim.56
52

See Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.).
See Maurice S. Amos & Frederick Walton, AMOS AND WALTON’S
INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 209 (F.H. Lawson et al. eds., 3d ed, 1967); 11
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 8, at 10 (1986).
54
See Avant-projet de reforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du
Code civil), et du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil), supra
note 5.
55
See id., art. 1371.
56
Id.
53
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2. Germany
Like France, Germany prohibits awards of punitive damages in
civil actions. In fact, German courts have traditionally considered this
rule to be a matter of fundamental public policy.
In a 1992 decision, the German Federal Court of Justice (the
German Supreme Court) refused to recognize and enforce a punitive
damages award from a California court on the ground that the award violated German ordre public.57 In that case, a California court awarded
US$350,000 in compensatory damages and US$400,000 in punitive damages to a claimant who had alleged that a citizen of both the United States
and Germany had sexually abused him.58 The Federal Court of Justice
enforced the compensatory damages award, but refused to enforce the
punitive damages award. The court explained that the “enforcement of
the [punitive damages] judgment would be contrary to the ‘compensation
idea underlying damages,’ which stems from the constitutional principle
of reasonableness, and also contrary to the ‘penal monopoly of the State’
to impose punitive sanctions.”59
Although Germany has historically been steadfastly against any
recognition of punitive damages in civil actions, a recent study by Ger57

See Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof, IXth Civil Senate, June 4, 1992,
Docket No. IX ZR 149/91, [1992] Wertpapiermitteilungen 1451, summarized in
pertinent part in Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American MoneyJudgments in Germany—The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM.
J. COMP. L. 729, 730–31 (1992).
58
See id. at 730.
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man scholar Volker Behr finds that the opposition to such damages may
be eroding. He states that, while German law states that damages must be
purely compensatory, “[German] courts frequently award damages that
cannot seriously be considered compensatory.”60 For example, in one
case involving infringement of the right to personality,61 the German Federal Supreme Court held that the amount of damages awarded by the
lower court was too small to have a deterrent effect.62 Further, in intellectual property cases, some of the methods available for calculating
damages go beyond mere compensation of the plaintiff.63 Moreover, in
response to a European Community Directive and two decisions of the
European Court of Justice, German courts must now allow damages sufficient to act as a deterrent in sex discrimination cases.64 A similar approach is likely in other discrimination cases now that the European
community has enacted additional directives regarding discrimination.65
59

Kühn, supra note 17, at 45 (quoting German Supreme Court).
Behr, supra note 6, at 130.
61
BGHZ 128, 1 (1) (Caroline I) (F.R.G.).
62
See id.
63
See Behr, supra note 6, at 137–38.
64
See id. at 139–44 (arguing that in light of European Community Directive
76/207/EEC (calling for equal treatment of men and women and judicial recourse for
persons wronged by failure to comply with the principle of equal treatment) and
Case C-180/95, Draehmpaehl v. Urania Immovbilienservice oHG, 1997 E.C.R. I2195 (holding new BGB section 611a, enacted to implement the EC directive, was
inadequate and stating that damages must adequately deter the defendant and other
employers from discriminating on the basis of gender), courts in Germany must have
the authority to award what amounts to punitive damages in employment cases involving claims of gender discrimination).
65
See Behr, supra note 6, at 145 (citing European Community Directive
2000/78/EEC (prohibiting employment discrimination and harassment based on
religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation) and European Community
Directive 2000/43/EEC (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of racial; or ethnic
60
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Professor Behr predicts that, although German courts have in the past
refused to enforce American punitive damages awards, they may eventually do so as long as the punitive damages awards are not excessive.66
Finally, it should be noted that the German Monopolies Commission has called for the awarding of double damages in certain antitrust
cases to deter parties from engaging in anticompetitive behavior and to
encourage private claims to enforce anticompetitive laws.67 While to date
legislation has not been introduced to award such damages, the fact that
the Commission has called for its introduction may signal a shift away
from the absolute prohibition on the award punitive damages in civil actions.
3. European Union68
The most significant change, however, would come if the European Commission were to adopt a proposal calling for the awarding of
punitive damages for breach of EC antitrust rules.

The Commission

floated such a change in a recent Green Paper entitled “Damages Actions

origin)).
66
See Behr, supra note 6, at 160.
67
See Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der 7, GWB-Novelle, Special Report of the Monopolies Commission provided in accordance with s44(1) section 4
ARC, March 2004, marginal no. 83, discussed in Ulf Böge & Konard Ost, Up and
Running, or is it? Private Enfrocement – The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives, 27(4) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 197, 201 (Apr. 2006).
68
“The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights,
albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only the Member
States but also their nationals.” NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, [1963]
ECR 3.
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for breach of EC Treaty antitrust rules.”69 This Green Paper was “part of
an effort to improve the enforcement of competition law[,] . . . identify
obstacles to a more efficient system for bringing [damages claims for
infringement of EC antitrust law,] and propose options for solving these
problems.”70 One of the proposals called for allowing double damages
for horizontal cartels,71 which the Commission saw as a means to provide
“a sufficient incentive to bring [antitrust actions] in relation to the most
serious infringements. . . .”72
Comments to the proposal from member States have been mixed.
The Office of Fair Trading of the United Kingdom indicated an openness
to considering this type of damage,73 but a number of civil law countries

69

The Commission publishes Green Papers to generate discussion and seek
input from interested parties on a specific subject. Green papers may lead to legislation. See European Commission, http://europa.eu/documents/comm/index_en.htm
(last visited July 18, 2006).
70
Green Paper: Damages Actions for Breach of EC Treaty Antitrust Rules,
supra note 7, at 3.
71
See id. at 7.
72
See European Commission Green Paper on damages actions for breach of EC
Treaty anti-trust rules – frequently asked questions (December 20, 2005), available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/489&format=H
TML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (suggesting that double damages
could serve as an incentive to bring an antitrust action).
73
However, the Office of Fair Trading noted that its comments might change
depending on the outcome of Healthcare at Home v. Genzyme Limited, case number
1060/5/7/06, registered on 5 April 2006, where exemplary damages in a competition
case, which have never been awarded in England or Wales, are being considered.
See Comments of the Office of Fair Trading, supra note 22 (opposing “compulsory
multiple damages,” but stating that “it may be appropriate for the ‘double damages’
concept to form the focus or starting point for the court when it is considering an
award of exemplary damages for breaches of competition law”). But see Comments
of the Department of Trade and Industry (U.K.), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/085.pdf
(stating that while the UK allows punitive damages in certain circumstances, “[t]he

20

Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages

saw this as making an unacceptable change in their fundamental public
policy rules.74
Commentators are similarly divided on the issue. Some have argued that changes, such as those proposed in the Green Paper, must be
made to ensure that antitrust rules are enforced.75 Others have argued that
they are unnecessary and, in particular, the introduction of double damages would be incompatible with the constitutional principles in many
civil law countries that view the imposition of penal sanctions as exclusively available in state-instigated actions.76
4. Spain
Although Spain is a civil law country that does not award punitive

Government’s current policy is that there should be no further lessening through
statute of the restrictions on the availability of punitive damages in civil proceedings”).
74
See, e.g., Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology
and the Federal Cartel Office on the Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (F.R.G.), supra note 4; Comments of the
Finnish
Ministry
of
Trade
and
Industry,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/046_en.
pdf;
Comments of the Irish Competition Authority, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/040.pdf;
Comments
of
Lithuania’s
Competition
Council,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/061.pdf;
Comments of the Royal Ministry of Government Administration and Reform (Nor.),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/069.pdf;
Comments of the Romanian Competition Council (in consultation with the Romanian
Ministry
of
Justice),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/020.pdf.
75
See, e.g., John Phesant, Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules: The European Commission’s Green Paper 27(7) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
365, 369, 378–9 (Jul. 2006).
76
See, e.g., Christian Diemer, The Green Paper on Damages: Actions for
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 27(6) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 309, 314–15
(Jun. 2006).
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damages in private actions, the Tribunal Supremo recently enforced an
American judgment that included treble damages for “unauthorized use of
intellectual property, violation of a registered trademark, and unfair competition.”77 There, Miller Import Corp. (an American company) and Florence S.R.L. (an Italian company) filed an action in the federal district
court in Texas against Alabastres Alfredo, S.A. (a Spanish company) for
the unauthorized use of intellectual property, violation of a registered
trademark and unfair competition.78 Miller Import and Florence S.L.R.
obtained a judgment, which included an award of treble damages, and
sought to have that judgment recognized and enforced in Spain.79 The
defendant claimed that the Spanish courts should not recognize and enforce a treble damages award, because it was penal in nature and contrary
to the public policy of Spain.80 The Tribunal Supremo disagreed and enforced the award notwithstanding the fact that it contained an award of
punitive damages.
The court initially noted that the award in this case served several
purposes: compensation for the defendant’s conduct, a sanction to show
disapproval for engaging in wrongful behavior, and to prevent similar
behavior in the future.81 It also pointed out, however, that “it is not always that easy, in addition, to differentiate concepts of compensation, and
77

See Miller Import, supra note 9, at 231.
See id.
79
See id.
80
See id. at 241.
78

22

Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages

to limit the corresponding sum of the coercive sanction and the sum
which corresponds to reparation for moral damages[,]” which are allowed
in Spain.82 Indeed, the court noted that Spanish law permits some (albeit
minimal) overlap between civil and criminal concepts of compensation
for injuries and, as a result, the concept of punitive damages was not
completely contrary to Spain’s public policy.83 It also took notice of the
fact that U.S. courts have adopted the principle of “proportionality” in
awarding punitive damages, and here the treble damages award corresponded to “the material injuries effectively caused” and was part of the
“legal norm.”84 The court also opined that there existed among countries
a common desire to protect intellectual property rights and that the underlying interest served by the award were not unknown in Spanish law.85
Based on these considerations, the court concluded that punitive damages
cannot be considered a concept that is completely counter to public policy
of Spain.86

B. Recent Decisions in Common Law Countries Enforcing American
Punitive Damages Awards
81

See id. at 241–42.
See id.242.
83
See id.
84
See id.
85
See id.
86
Id. One author has cautioned that this decision should be interpreted narrowly. See Jablonski, supra note 9, at 230. He points out that “[t]he Court stressed
that the damages award reflected the defendant’s intentional and egregious conduct
in violating the plaintiffs’ intellectual and industrial property rights, conduct which is
82
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Despite generally negative views concerning American awards of
punitive damages, courts in Australia and Canada have recently enforced
American awards of punitive damages.87
1. Australia
While punitive damages are available in Australia, the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, in Schnabel v. Lui, declined to enforce the
punitive damages portion of an American court judgment.88 However, a
more recent decision by the Supreme Court of South Australia indicates
that there is no general prohibition on the enforcement of American
awards of punitive damages and that Schnabel v. Lui is an exceptional
case.
In Schnabel v. Lui, a U.S. federal court in California had awarded
plaintiffs approximately US$8.7 million in punitive damages. The damages were based on claims for “breach of written contract, breach of oral
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, conversion, fraud, and constructive fraud.”89 In
denying enforcement of the punitive damages award, the Supreme Court
of New South Wales determined that the California court had awarded
punitive damages because of the failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders, not because of the defendants’ behavior toward the plainand must be sanctioned with vigor in countries with market economies.” Id.
87
See Benefit Strategies Group, supra note 8; Beals v. Saldanha, supra note 9;
Miller Import, supra note 9.
88
See Schnabel v. Lui, [2002] N.S.W.S.C. 15 (unreported decision) (Australia).
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tiffs.90 The distinction was important because, according to the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, “the Courts of one country are prohibited
from executing the penal laws of another or enforcing penalties recoverable in favour of the State.”

91

The court concluded that the punitive

damages in this case were “within the categories of a penal law or other
public law of the foreign jurisdiction.”92
Schnabel v. Lui illustrates one Australian court’s clear unwillingness to enforce an American punitive damages award where that award
was associated with foreign penal sanctions. However, this result should
be contrasted with that of Benefit Strategies Group, Inc. v. Anor Prider,
another recent case where the Supreme Court of South Australia opined
that an American award of punitive damages may be enforceable in Australia.93
In that case, the plaintiffs obtained in an American court a judgment by default against defendants in the amount of US$16,466,731.73,
which included US$13,125,000 in punitive damages (five times the
amount that was allegedly stolen from the plaintiffs).

Plaintiffs then

sought to enforce the judgment in South Australia, but conceded in the
enforcement proceedings that the award of punitive damages was unenforceable in Australian courts. The trial court inter alia entered an order
89

Id.
See id.
91
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Id.
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enforcing the judgment awarding actual damages, attorneys’ fees and
costs, and interest, but excluding the award of punitive damages. On appeal, Justice Bleby of the Supreme Court of South Australia noted:
The judgment sought to be enforced in this case, although
described as “punitive damages,” was a judgment in respect of a private right for [the defendant’s] ‘brazen and
fraudulent conduct’. There was no public element in the
remedy being enforced [which might have implicated the
general principle that the courts of one country do not
execute the criminal laws of another]. In my view, it did
not fall within the type of judgment which this Court
would refuse to enforce on public policy grounds relating
to the non-enforcement of foreign penal or revenue laws.94
He then distinguished Schnabel v. Lui on the ground that the award denied enforcement in that case was a penal award having public connotation, because it was given for the failure to comply with a court order.
With respect to the size of the award in Benefit Strategies, Justice Bleby
stated:
The amount awarded in this case[, approximately
US$16.5 million,] is substantially more than might be
awarded by this Court, but that is not the point. In this
country an award of exemplary or punitive damages may
be justified where the defendant’s conduct shows a cruel
and reckless disregard of the plaintiff, thereby demonstrating the defendant’s callousness and indifference towards the plaintiff in committing the wrong. Such an
award of punitive damages is not contrary to public policy
in Australia. It is not for this Court to question the
amount awarded by the United States court.95
2. Canada

93

See Benefit Strategies Group, supra note 8.
Id. at ¶ 68.
95
Id. at ¶ 73.
94

26

Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages
Similarly, in Beals v. Saldanha,96 Canada’s Supreme Court en-

forced an American judgment that included punitive damages. In that
case, a Florida court had entered a default judgment against the defendants, residents of Ontario, and a jury had awarded compensatory damages of US$210,000, punitive damages of US$50,000, and post-judgment
interest.97 When the enforcement action was brought in Canada, the damages, including interest, totaled CAN$800,000.98 The Canadian Supreme
Court found that the defense of public policy, as well as other defenses,
did not prevent enforcement in this case.99 The Court held that “the public policy defence is not meant to bar enforcement of a judgment rendered
by a foreign court with a real and substantial connection to the cause of
action for the sole reason that the claim in that foreign jurisdiction would
not yield comparable damages in Canada.”100 The Court noted, however,
that “it could be argued in another case that the arbitrariness of the award
can properly fit into a public policy argument.”101
IV. FORECASTS
Do these developments indicate a change toward enforcement of
American punitive damages awards? While only by watching future developments will it be possible to know the answer to this question for
certain, the cases and legislative proposals discussed herein appear to
96
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represent a shift in the current thinking on punitive damages, but not a
tidal wave that will sweep away all barriers to enforcement of foreign
awards of such damages. Specific forecasts for the countries discussed
earlier in this essay are elaborated below.
A. Calmer Seas?
If France ultimately enacts the proposal to allow punitive damages in civil actions, the enactment would constitute a sweeping change
in that country’s position, and may mean that France will be more willing
to enforce American punitive damages awards in the future. Further,
while Germany still claims not to award punitive damages and court decisions have held that such damages violate German ordre public, elements
of this type of damage appear to be awarded in cases involving employment discrimination, the right to personality and intellectual property.
These cases suggest that Germany may be moving closer to accepting
punitive damages in certain categories of private actions, which would
also be a major change in its public policy.102
Moreover, the European Commission seems to be open to awarding of damages in private actions that would penalize a party for engaging
in certain conduct, deter others from engaging such conduct and provide
an incentive for parties to enforce laws prohibiting such conduct.103 If the

100

Id. at ¶ 76.
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See Behr, supra note 6, at 159–60.
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See Green Paper: Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules, supra
101
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Commission ultimately adopts the proposal to allow the awarding of punitive relief in antitrust cases, its action would significantly affect how its
twenty-five member states104 treat such damages, particularly since most
of those countries do not allow punitive damages in private actions and a
number have historically considered them to be contrary to public policy.
The allowance of punitive damages—even in the relatively limited context of civil antitrust actions—would not only signal a significant shift in
public policy, but also could require constitutional changes in some of the
affected countries.105
The greater receptivity toward awarding punitive damages in
Europe suggests that perhaps there is no longer such a fundamental public
policy as to prevent the enforcement of all foreign punitive damage
awards.106

note 7, at 4 (stating that one of the purposes of damages was deterrence); European
Commission Green Paper on damages actions for breach of EC Treaty anti-trust
rules – frequently asked questions, supra note 72 (suggesting that double damages
could create an incentive to bring certain antitrust actions); Behr, supra note 6, at
144 (discussing European Court of Justice holding that damages must be sufficient
to deter and punish acts of discrimination).
104
See European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/governments/index_en.htm (last
visited July 24, 2006) (listing twenty-five member countries, as well as five “candidate countries”).
105
See generally, Comments on the Green paper on Damages actions for breach of
the
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antitrust
rules,
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp_cont
ributions.html.
106
As noted, there is a difference between domestic policy and international
public policy, the later of which encompasses only those basic notions of morality
and justice accepted by civilized countries. See supra text accompanying notes 28–
29. Because international public policy is much narrower in scope than domestic
public policy, many have argued that, in a civil law country that applies the international public policy standard, a foreign award of punitive damages would not be per
se unenforceable. See Gotanda, supra note 51, at 103 (1997) (citing authorities).
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Recent decisions enforcing foreign awards of punitive damages in
Australia, Canada and Spain also suggest that traditional hostility to
American awards of such damages may be dissipating. However, while
the Supreme Court of South Australia noted that it was not for Australian
courts to question the amount of punitive damages awarded by a foreign
court, the court in that case had before it a US$13 million punitive damages award that was only four times the compensatory damages award. It
is unclear how the court would rule on a case like In re The Exxon Valdez
where the punitive damages award was US$4.5 billion, or Bullock v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc.,107 where the US$38 million punitive damages
award was thirty-three times the compensatory damages award. In Spain,
where the Tribunal Supremo enforced treble damages, the court emphasized the importance of “proportionality,” thus suggesting that it might
not enforce a foreign award where the amount of punitive damages
greatly exceeds the amount of compensatory damages.108 Further, the
Canadian Supreme Court left open the possibility that a very large award
of punitive damages might not be recognized and enforced.109
B. Clouds on the Horizon
Not all recent developments point toward greater enforceability of
107

138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
See Miller Import, supra note ___. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme
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foreign punitive damages awards.

Unlike the New York Convention

which contains a public policy exception, the 2005 Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements not only contains a similar public policy exception,
but also explicitly states that a country may refuse to enforce a judgment
that includes punitive damages to the extent that the award does not compensate a party for “actual loss or harm suffered.”110 Thus, the Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements would allow a country to refuse
to enforce a foreign judgment containing punitive damages even if such
judgment would not violate the country’s public policy.
Similarly, in Canada, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,111 which was drafted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada but has not yet been enacted anywhere in Canada, states that when a
Canadian court is asked to enforce foreign award of non-compensatory
damages, it “shall limit enforcement of the damages . . . to the amount of
similar or comparable damages that could have been awarded in [the enacting province or territory.]”112
Moreover, while the divide between common law and civil law
countries on the awarding of punitive damages in private actions may be
110

Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 32, art. 11. The Convention also gives the court the authority to “take in account whether and to what
extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses
relating to the proceeding.” Id.
111
Available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1e5.
112
Id. at § 6. According to one scholar, “[h]ad the Uniform Act been in effect in
Ontario when the Beals judgment was presented for recognition and enforcement,
the result might well have been different.” Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages
Revisited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too
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shrinking, American courts continue to award very large punitive damage
awards in some cases and, as noted previously, courts in other countries
are likely to view such awards as excessive.
V. CONCLUSION
American parties should not anticipate smooth sailing when seeking to have a domestic punitive damages award recognized and enforced
in other countries. While obstacles to the enforcement of such awards
may be dissipating, there still are significant hurdles that may bar enforcement in some cases. Public policy concerns are most likely to block
enforcement when punitive damage awards are large or in cases where the
defendant’s conduct is not particularly egregious. However, courts may
be more willing to enforce awards of punitive damages where they serve
purposes in addition to punishing the defendant, such as preventing defendants from retaining profits obtained through unlawful conduct, deterring others from engaging in similar activity, encouraging enforcement of
certain types of claims, or paying for attorneys’ fees and other costs.

Far, 24 J.L. & COM. 181, 192 (2005).

